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This study examines the tax reporting consequences of financial reporting discretion. Using a matched
sample of financial statements with tax returns, I provide estimates of the accuracy of tax return information
inferred from financial statements. To examine the tradeoffs between financial and tax reporting, I
model the relation discretionary financial accounting accruals have to discretionary federal tax accruals.
The methodology takes advantage of the contemporaneous nature of  reporting to mitigate econometric
problems identified in previous research.  I find the extent tax reporting reflects discretionary financial
reporting varies dramatically by industry, profitability, and the sign of discretionary accruals.  I also
find managers are able to undertake tax reducing activities with less of an effect on financial reporting
than tax increasing accruals, consistent with recent evidence on the differential growth of book and
tax income, and with tax avoidance activities.
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Estimates of the Magnitude of Financial and Tax Reporting Conflicts
1.  Introduction
Companies face inherently conflicting interests in their reporting for financial and tax
purposes.  While higher financial reporting earnings are generally viewed as favorable, higher
taxable income can result in additional tax liabilities.  Although differences in the amounts of
income reported under each system have existed since the inception of the corporate income tax
(Smith and Butters, 1949), over the past decade an increasing disparity has developed between
both the levels, and growth rates, of each income measure.  In an analysis of the tax returns of
large corporations, the U.S. Treasury (1999) reported income for financial and tax accounting
purposes diverged sharply during the latter part of the 1990s, a pattern also found in analyses of
publicly-available data by Plesko (2000b), Manzon and Plesko (2002), and Desai (2003), and in
comparisons of national income account data with tax collections (Sullivan 1999).  Plesko and
Shumofsky (2004) document that aggregate pretax book income reported by U.S. corporations
on their 1995 tax returns was 22 percent higher than its tax accounting equivalent - a difference
that increased to more than 59 percent in 1999, approximately $318 billion in the aggregate. 
This divergence in the amount of income reported under each system has been offered as prima
facie evidence of increases in tax avoidance activities of firms and of a deterioration in the
efficacy of the tax system.
1  Increasing book tax differences, coupled with concerns about
corporate tax compliance generally, have also prompted hearing by the Senate Finance
Committee which included a discussion on the merits of requiring the disclosure of corporations’2See Grassley (2006) for an overview of the hearing and Kleinbard (2006) for a discussion of the merits of
partial disclosure of the corporate income tax return.
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tax return information to improve the public’s knowledge of firms’ tax positions.   Such an
argument is implicitly predicated on the assumption that the tax information that would be useful
to the public cannot be inferred from the published financial statements.
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This study empirically addresses the extent of the tradeoffs between financial and tax
reporting in an earnings management setting. I begin by analyzing the ability of tax information
inferred from financial statements to accurately characterize both the tax position and tax return
values.  Then, utilizing a standard model of discretionary accruals, I estimate the extent the tax
reporting system reflects discretionary financial reporting decisions.  Differences in accounting
rules will yield differences in both the levels, and patterns, of accruals under each reporting
system, even though each is driven by the same underlying economic activities.  I employ an
empirical approach to exploit these differences to obtain more precise estimates of discretionary
accruals, mitigating concerns over omitted variables and mis-specification in accruals models.
Further, the correlation of the estimated discretionary accruals from each system provides a
measure of the extent to which discretionary actions in one system, such as those taken to
increase financial reporting income, is reflected in the accruals of the other.
The intuitive motivation for this paper is as follows.  If tax and financial reporting were
based on identical rules, any change in income or expense under one system would be perfectly
reflected in the other.   Under identical rules, tax reports could not escape being affected by
financial reporting-motivated activities and financial accounting choices would have immediate
tax consequences. At the other extreme, if tax and financial measures of income were unrelated
(e.g., both random draws from some underlying distribution) then tax accounting income3Deferred tax accounting is ignored for the sake of this example.  So long as a system based upon random
draws treated all differences as permanent the example would still hold.
3
measures would not be affected by the financial reporting amounts.  Any action taken to change
reported book income would not be contemporaneously reflected in the firm’s tax accounts, and
would yield no tax reporting cost.
3  
In practice, and design, the U.S. tax system falls between these two extremes.  Although
both accounting systems report income measures derived from the same underlying economic
transactions, the patterns, and magnitudes, of income and expenses recognized under each
system vary.  Some aspects of reporting may be identical under both  (e.g., cash sales with no
right of return), while others are disparate (e.g., non-qualified stock options).   This latter
category is inclusive of numerous transactions that have generated concern over companies’
abilities to greatly reduce tax liabilities without any financial reporting consequences.
I find that many important corporate tax attributes cannot be inferred from publicly-
available financial reporting information, a result that potentially supports arguments for greater
public disclosure of tax information by firms.  With respect to firms’ ability to differentially
report income to tax authorities and in financial reports, I find the degree to which tax reporting
reflects discretionary financial reporting decisions  varies significantly by industry, profitability,
and by the sign of discretionary accruals.  These results imply that some managers are able to
recognize significant financial reporting income without tax consequences and undertake
substantial tax reducing activities without being subject to financial reporting costs.  Both of
these results are consistent  with recent evidence on the differential growth of book and tax
income and with tax sheltering activities.
The paper also provides two methodological contributions. First, it demonstrates the4Certain transactions have transparent effects that appear to influence behavior, such as inventory methods
(e.g. Hunt et al. 1996), the management of stock options (Matsunaga et al. 1992) and financing methods (Engel et al.
1999).  Shackelford and Shevlin (2002), Maydew (2002) and Scholes, et al. (2002) chapter 6, all discuss the
importance of non-tax considerations in the tax planning process. 
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efficacy of an alternative approach to the estimation of accruals models that utilizes tax
information to obtain better estimates of nondiscretionary accruals.  Second, the industry level
estimates provided in the paper can be used in future empirical studies to provide cross-sectional
controls for the extent of book-tax conformity, similar to country controls utilized in
international comparisons.
The next section of the paper describes prior research on the tension between financial
and tax reporting. The third section presents the methodology of the paper, followed in the fourth
section by a description of the data and the construction of the sample.  Section five presents an
analysis of the matched tax return to financial statement data, and tests the ability of tax
information inferred from financial statements to assess tax characteristics.  The estimation
results for the model are provided in section six presents, along with a discussion of both
aggregate and industry-level results, and a comparison of estimation results using different
datasets and specifications.  The final section presents the conclusions.
2.  Prior research
The tension between financial reporting and other firm objectives is a common research
theme in accounting choice generally (Fields et al. 2001) and in tax (Shackelford and Shevlin
2001, Maydew, 2001).  In examining the financial-tax reporting tradeoff specifically, the
empirical literature has been inconsistent in its assumptions regarding the linkage of the two, and
studies have made conflicting assumptions.
4  For example, in examining the effects of various5
aspects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992) test whether firms
deferred income to take advantage of declining tax rates, assuming such deferrals are reflected in
taxable income in each period.  By contrast, the earnings management literature surrounding the
adoption of the book income preference of the corporate alternative minimum tax (Gramlich
1991, Boynton et al. 1992, Manzon 1992)  assumes reductions in book income were generally
independent of the amount of contemporaneous taxable income, since only asymmetric
reductions would reduce the book-tax difference of a firm. 
In an attempt to directly measure the link between accounting choices, Erickson et al.
(2002) analyzed a small sample of firms subject to SEC action for overstating revenue.  They
conclude these firms concurrently increased reported taxable income, with firms apparently
willing to pay approximately 11 cents in tax per each dollar of overstated earnings, based on
revisions to the tax expense.  There is no indication these results can be generalized beyond their
small and unique sample, given these firms not only aggressively overstated earnings but did so
in a way so as to attract regulatory scrutiny.  Further, given their reliance on the tax expense,
they cannot quantify the extent to which additional taxes were actually paid beyond some
disclosures of expected tax refunds.   Nonetheless, that firms found it necessary to pay additional
taxes implies that not all changes in reported book income can be made independent of taxable
income.
Other evidence of potential costs is found in Mills (1998), who reports firms with greater
book-tax differences are subject to greater scrutiny by the IRS and to greater proposed
adjustments in their returns.  The full extent of the cost of differential reporting cannot be
inferred from her results since the ultimate resolution of the adjustments was not observed and5Hanlon and Shevlin (2000) and Manzon and Plesko (2001) both discuss the accounting treatment of stock
options and their distortionary effects on the tax accounts of financial statements.   Boynton et al. (2004),  Plesko
(2002, 2003), and Plesko and Shumofsky (2004)  present tax-return tabulations on identifiable sources of book-tax
differences.
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the final change in taxes paid being only a small percentage of such adjustments.  However, her
results demonstrate that larger book tax differences will draw the attention of tax authorities to
the extent that they are observable in the tax return, and therefore a divergence between reported
book and taxable income may impose additional tax costs on the firm.   Potentially reducing this
cost, Mills and Plesko (2003) document significant shortcomings in the reporting of book
income for tax purposes, leaving open the possibility that many reporting differences remain
unreported to, and undetected by, tax authorities.
Even if explicit tax sheltering is not the goal other accounting practices, such as the
treatment of non-qualified stock options, have caused substantial differences in the amount of
income reported for financial and tax purposes - differences not necessarily reflected in the tax
accounts of a company’s financial reports and supported by recent analyses of aggregate
financial and tax return data.
5 In addition to these accounting differences, methodological
concerns have been raised over the empirical approaches used to test for tax and non-tax costs
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).
3.  Methodology
To examine the reporting relation between the two accounting systems I focus on
differences in accruals under each as the amount of cash collected by a company in any given
period is independent of the accounting method.6“Tax accounting accruals” is a bit of a misnomer in that firms are not as easily able to affect taxable
income through non-cash means.  However, actions a firm might engage in to manipulate taxable income without
affecting book income would exploit the differential treatment of a transaction by the accounting systems.  For
example, repatriating foreign earnings will not affect the total amount of pre-tax cash a firm has, but will increase tax
net income without affecting pretax book income.  
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where  is pretax reported book income and  is the firm’s pretax cash flow. RBIit , CFit ,
Similarly, tax reporting total accruals for company i in period t can be defined as:
where   equals reported taxable income.  Assuming cash flows are the same under each TIit ,
accounting system, tax accruals will differ from pretax book accruals to the extent pretax book
income differs from taxable income, that is
As a result, tax accounting accruals can be estimated from financial accounting accruals if one
knows the difference between reported book and taxable income.  Such differences will depend
on both timing differences (such as the differences in depreciation patterns) and scope (such as
the inclusion or exclusion of unrepatriated foreign income).
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Following McNichols and Wilson (1988)  total accruals under each accounting system8
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can be decomposed into their non-discretionary (NDA)  and discretionary (DA) components:
where the estimate of  is defined as the predicted value from an accruals equation, and NDAi
is defined as the equation’s residual.   DAi
The specification and estimation of accruals models has been the subject of significant
discussion, with critical reviews of earnings management methodologies performed by Dechow
et al. (1995),  Thomas and Zhang (1999), McNichols (2000),  Fields (2001), and Kothari (2001).  
Thomas and Zhang (1999) compare a number of empirical approaches to estimating accruals
models, inclusive of the specifications tested by Dechow et al. (1995).  While they conclude
none of the models are particularly strong, an industry level version of the Jones (1991) model
was found to outperform the original Jones (1991) model.  As a result, a modification of the
Jones (1991) specification is used to estimate financial accruals:
where )Sales is the change in sales from the past year (adjusted for changes in accounts
receivables) , PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment, and At-1 is prior year total assets.   A
lag of total accruals is included to capture mean reversion.   For tax accruals, the empirical7Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), in particular, propose an instrumental variables approach to address
these issues. McNichols (1999) suggests that additional variables be included to control for long-term growth.
8Greene (1997) discusses Zellner’s method of estimating a feasible generalized least squares regression
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model is specified as
with the explanatory variables the same as those used in equation (6) with the exception of
)Gross Receipts, which is the tax accounting equivalent of sales.  The predicted values from
these models are taken as estimates of nondiscretionary accruals, and the residuals as estimates
of discretionary accruals (DA).
An important concern highlighted in the reviews of empirical accruals models has been
the extent to which the estimation of total accruals equations, such as (6) and (7), using ordinary
least squares (OLS) are affected by omitted variables and the simultaneity of the explanatory
variables with the methods available to manage earnings.
7  In this setting, pretax total accruals
under each accounting system are driven by the same underlying economic activity of the firm. 
Assuming total accruals are determined contemporaneously, rather than simultaneously, an
econometrically efficient approach is to jointly estimate the two equations using a system of
seemingly unrelated regressions.
8  In such a setting, cross-correlations and the omitted variables
affecting each equation will be captured in the covariance matrix, and the independence of the
errors across the two equations can be explicitly tested.  Further, unlike the residuals from OLS,
the residuals from FGLS will not be jointly correlated with the omitted variables affecting both9Calegari (2000) estimates the effect of capital structure changes on discretionary accruals through the use
of a simultaneous-equation approach.  However, to derive his estimates of discretionary accruals he estimates his


















equations, eliminating any induced correlation of concern to previous authors.  Finally, any
correlated regularity in the two different accruals processes will lead to more efficient estimates
of the parameters.  Thus, the use of FGLS residuals in place of OLS residuals addresses the same
set of econometric issues as Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), but potentially provides an
easier to implement alternative to both their instrumental variables approach, and the need to
search for additional covariates to include in Jones’ (1991) based models.
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After obtaining estimates of discretionary accruals  from the joint estimation of (6) and
(7)  the relation between discretionary accruals across the two accounting systems can be
estimated as
The coefficient N will capture mean differences in accruals across the two systems and T
provides an estimate of the amount by which estimated discretionary accruals for financial
reporting are contemporaneously related to discretionary accruals related to taxable income.  If
T=0, discretionary tax accruals are unrelated to discretionary financial accruals.  If T…0, the
magnitude of the coefficient will capture the change in the tax accrual associated with a change
in pretax book accruals, and provide a measure of the extent of tax reporting costs associated
with earnings management.  
Additional covariates can be added to equation (8) to test for difference due to other
characteristics.  In order to test for asymmetry in the effects of the sign of discretionary accruals10A description of the IRS sample and sampling methodology can be found in U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (2004).
11
and of the tax status of the firm the equation is specified as:
where the explanatory discretionary accruals variable is split into two separate variable
depending on the sign of DA, and two additional variables are created by multiplying each DA
variable by a binary variable equal to one if the firm has negative tax net income in the current
year.  The addition of an interaction for negative tax net income allows for testing whether




I use a matched sample of firms’ financial statement and tax return data for tax years
1994 to 2001.   The advantage of the data used in this paper is the ability to observe actual
reported taxable income rather than an estimate based on financial reporting.  To construct the
sample, I begin with the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income’s (SOI) annual
corporation file, containing tax return information for more than 80,000 corporations.
10   Tax
return data are recorded as filed, and validated for accuracy, but do not reflect any subsequent
amendments or audit adjustments. Firms filing 1120-A, the corporate short form, as well as



































































000 0 ααβ β γ γ      (9)11Scaled pretax total accruals were calculated as pretax book income (data123+data16) less cash flows from
operations adjusted for deferred taxes (data308-data126).   Other Compustat variables used in the regressions are
assets (6), the change in sales (data 12) adjusted for the change in accounts receivables (data302), and gross property
plant and equipment (7).
12See Dworin (1985), Manzon and Plesko (2002), Mills (1998), Hanlon (2003), Plesko (2003), Mills and
Plesko (2003), and Boynton et al. (2004) for discussions of consolidation issues.  The effect of imposing a
consolidation rule should be to bias the estimation towards finding close links between the two systems.  With more
complicated firms, particularly those with multiple tax and financial entities, the ability of either set of data to
capture changes in the other will be reduced.
12
Financial statement information was drawn from Compustat
11 and matched to the tax
return data by employer identification number.  Non-matched firms were deleted, as were firms
with missing or zero assets, yielding 43,320 firm-year observations.  Of this group, 37,853 had
sufficient financial statement data to allow a simple comparison to the matched tax return. 
Summary statistics for this set of firms are provided in Table 1, Column (A).
To reduce the effects of consolidation, and focus solely on  accounting differences, the
value of total assets on the tax return balance sheet was compared to that reported in the financial
statement.  The balance sheet of the tax return (Schedule L) should reflect the assets and
liabilities of the tax filing entity, regardless of GAAP consolidation.
12  If the difference between
the two values exceeded 0.01 of the smaller value the record was deleted, reducing the sample to
17,617 firm-years.  Summary statistics for these firms are reported in Table 1, Column   ( C).
The estimation of equations (6) and (7) requires the imposition of additional restrictions
on the sample, yielding a final sample of 6,062 firm-year observations for 1996 to 2001.  
Observations for 1994 and 1995 were lost owing to the need to have lagged values in the
construction of the regression variables and the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the
regression. 
The tax return contains two different measures of income.  Tax net income (LINE28) is13Arguably, any change in IST as defined in the tax code will be the result of a change in tax net income. 
However, the opposite need not be true as any decrease in net income for a company with negative net income
would not affect IST, and an increase in net income would only change IST if it were large enough to make it positive. 
The modified definition allows for the possibility that firms could increase the amount of income reported to the IRS
without affecting their taxable income.
14 Plesko (2000a, 2003) discusses the limits of financial statement information to capture different attributes
of the tax return and the efficacy of alternative financial statement constructs.  Mills, et al. (2003) evaluate the ability
of Compustat to capture the correct amount of net operating loss carryforwards.
13
conceptually equivalent to pretax book income;  income subject to tax (IST) is determined after
the deduction for net operating losses and dividends received, but, unlike LINE28, is constrained
to be nonnegative for purposes of calculating tax liability.  I modify LINE28 by subtracting
special deductions (dividends received and net operating losses) to obtain a measure of taxable
income that can be negative.
13 
Because tax return information is not publicly available, I include estimates of tax
liability (data 63, Current Tax Expense) and taxable income, GROSS63, defined as the grossed-up
amount of data 63, plus the change in net operating loss carryforwards (item 52) and test its
ability to proxy for tax return information.
14
Given the unique nature of the data, the next section presents an analysis of the matched
sample of tax and financial statement data, and is followed by a discussion of the results of the
estimation of the accruals models.
5.  The financial statement as a source of tax information
The summary statistics provided in Table 1 allow for a test of an essential question of
interest to a broad group of financial statement users: how well does the financial statement
represent the tax characteristics of a firm?  For the sample of 37,853 matched firms, Column (B)
of Table 1 provides the results of a t-test for the hypothesis that the difference in the two series15While surprising, this result is not anomalous, and has been previously reported  by Mills et al. (2002) and 
Manzon and Plesko (2007).  Boynton et al. (2004) provide a detailed examination of consolidation differences for
tax and financial reporting and the effects on the interpretation of reported book-tax reporting differences.
14
(book minus tax) is statistically different from zero. The first cell in Column (B) reports that the
test of  whether book assets less tax assets is equal to zero cannot be accepted (t = -9.67).  While
this result is not surprising given the issues of consolidation discussed earlier, it is surprising that
mean assets reported on the tax return are greater than those reported on financial statements.
15
The next cell presents the results of the same test between reported receipts, and again
rejects that their difference is zero.  Mean sales reported on financial statements are more than 10
percent larger than those reported on the tax return. 
The third cell in Column (B)  shows the comparison of the amount of book income
reported to shareholders and the amount reported to tax authorities on the Schedule M-1.  In
contrast to the asset and gross receipts results, the values for pretax book income are not
statistically different from each other (t=0.71).  The next two cells report a similar result in
comparisons of the financial statement estimate of taxable income, GROSSS63, to both Tax Net
Income and Income Subject to Tax - in neither case can the hypothesis be rejected.  While these
results  suggest that, in large samples, the financial statement provides informative data
regarding firms’ taxable income, this finding is puzzling, given that both assets and revenues are
statistically different.  Further,  while grossing-up the current tax expense appears to
approximate taxable income, the current tax expense does not provide a statistically reliable
estimate of  firms’ actual tax liability, either before or after credits.  The mean of the current tax
expense (18.23) falls between the reported amount of tax before credits (20.16) and tax after
credits (14.88), and t-tests reject the hypotheses that the difference between the book amount and15
the tax amounts are zero.
Column (D) reports the analysis for the sample of 17,617 firm-year observations retained
because of the similarity in reported assets.  The smaller sample size - more than half of the
observations in Column (A) are dropped - highlights the difficulty in making proper inferences
about firms’ tax attributes from publicly available data, since the reporting entities are generally
different.  While the mean amount of revenues are statistically equivalent (t = 0.81), the average
amount of pre-tax book income reported to shareholders is statistically greater than the amount
reported on the tax return (t=3.47).  Similarly, the amount of taxable income inferred from the
financial statements is statistically greater than either reported tax net income (t=13.83) or
income subject to tax (t=6.63), suggesting that inferences of taxable income systematically
overstate the actual amount of taxable income for similarly consolidated entities.  Worth noting
here is that income subject to tax is larger than tax net income since tax net income can be
negative while income subject is bounded below by zero. This pattern continues into the
estimates of actual tax liability, either before or after credits, with the average amount inferred
from financial statements statistically greater than actual tax before, or after, credits (t= 2.71 and
6.45, respectively).  
Finally, Column (F) provides a similar analysis for the smaller sample of 6,062 firm-year
observations retained because of the similarity in reported assets and the availability of data to be
used in testing the central questions of this paper.  The results for this sample are similar to those
reported in Column (D), with only gross receipts reported under the two systems not statistically
different from each other (t=0.38).  Book income reported to shareholders is greater than
reported on the tax return’s Schedule M-1 (t=1.87), as is estimated taxable income (GROSSS63 is16
statistically larger than both tax net income (t=9.84) and income subject to tax (t=6.00)).  The
values of  tax liability, either before or after credits, are both smaller than the amount reported as
the current tax expense, and each is statistically different from the value inferred from the
financial statements.
Tables 2 and 3 provide further evidence on the efficacy of inferring the tax attributes of 
firms from financial statements by comparing the signs, rather than the levels, of taxable income
and tax liabilities.  Table 2, for each of the three samples, presents a cross tabulation of the sign
of tax net income (LINE28) with the sign of taxable income that is inferred from the financial
statements.   Arguably, similarity in the signs of these variables is a lower standard than the 
equivalence in magnitude, but a firm’s current tax position is an important determinant of
behavior.   The results are similar for all three comparisons: between 12 and 13 percent of firms
in the sample are mis-classified, and in all cases the majority of the mis-classifications using
financial statement information imply that a firm has taxable income when, based on the tax
return, it does not.   The greatest imbalances in mis-classification occur in the two cases where
conditions have been imposed to ensure that the entities are the most similar, with more than
twice as many firms incorrectly classified as taxable than mis-classified as non-taxable.
Table 3 repeats the comparisons of Table 2, but focuses on whether the sign of firms’ tax
liability (either before or after credits) is correctly inferred from the financial statements.  This
additional comparison is necessary because a firm may have no liability even when taxable
income is positive (primarily because of credits), or because a tax liability may exist even when
taxable income is zero (owing, for example, to non-income, recapture, or the minimum tax).  
The pattern of mis-classification for a current tax expense is the similar to that reported in Table17
2: mis-classifications in each of the six cases primarily label firms as taxable when they are not. 
The mis-classification is less pronounced in tax after credits than tax before credits, but remains
above 10 percent in each of the three samples. 
The data presented in Tables 1 through 3 provide strong evidence that financial statement
information yields misleading inferences about firms’ tax attributes.  These results,
encompassing many more years and observations than previous research, are consistent with
prior conceptual (Hanlon, 2003, Mills and Plesko 2003) and empirical (Dworin, 1985, Plesko
2001, Mills et al. 2002,  McGill and Outslay, 2004) analyses.  At a minimum, these results
suggest that financial statement-based tax inferences must be interpreted and used with caution. 
With respect to th current policy debate over the magnitude, and trend, of book-tax differences,
the results of Tables 1 through 3 show that measures constructed from financial statements will
understate the magnitude of reporting differences.  The extent to which financial statement
constructs may adversely affect the results of empirical research is addressed in the next section.
6.  Model estimation
A.  General results
Estimation of the accrual models requires additional financial statement information from
each firm and the imposition of constraints on the data, leading to a final sample of 6,062 firm-
year observations.  While some of this data has been  described in Column (E) of Table 1 and
further in Tables 2 and 3, summary statistics for the additional variables are presented in  Table
4,  Panel A.  To obtain total accruals under tax accounting the difference between pretax book
and taxable income was subtracted from book total accruals.   For tax accruals based on16Coefficient estimates from the accruals equations have been omitted in the interest of space.
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Compustat item 63, GROSS63, the difference between estimated taxable income and book income
was subtracted from book total accruals.  
Panel B of Table 4 provides the correlations between pretax book income (Compustat
data item 170), tax net income (LINE28) and GROSS63, the financial statement estimate of taxable
income.  The first column provides the correlations between pretax book income and the two
measures of taxable income. While the equality of means between these variables was rejected in
Table 1, Panel B shows that all of the correlations are statistically significant at one percent.  The
correlation for GROSS63 is higher than for modified taxable income (line 28), with correlations of
0.78 and 0.70, respectively, a non-surprising result since GROSS63 and pretax book income are
drawn from the same financial statement.  The second column of the panel shows that the
correlation between tax net income and GROSS63, the financial statement measure of the same
item is 0.67.   The third panel of Table 4 provides the correlations of scaled total accruals for
each definition.  Of the two tax income accruals, GROSSS63 is more highly correlated with pretax
book income accruals - again not a surprising result given that both are drawn from the same
financial statements. 
Table 5  provides a description of the industry distribution of the sample along with the
correlations of the residuals from jointly estimating equations (6) and (7).
16  Two sets of systems
of equations are estimated: System 1 utilizes tax return information to measure the effects on tax
reporting while System 2 substitutes tax return information inferred from financial statements. 
While it is usual for both regulated industries and financial services to be omitted from accruals
models, I include both as benchmarks.  Regulated industries are often excluded because the17Here and throughout the rest of the text, accepting or rejecting statistical tests are relative to a 1 percent
significance level.
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nature of the regulatory process makes them less interesting to study.  In this setting, however,
regulated industries should have relatively high correlations, and their inclusion allows for this
hypothesis to be examined.  Similarly, while the Jones (1992) model is viewed as less
representative for non-manufacturing industries, the applicability of the model can be directly
tested.  Further, any mis-specification due to omitted variables in the accruals model will be
mitigated through the use of FGLS.
The correlation of the residuals from the first-stage OLS regression provides information
on whether the assumptions of the OLS model are violated and an improvement can be made via
joint estimation.  A Breusch-Pagan test of the independence of each set of residuals was
performed for each set of equations, and independence of the residuals can be rejected in all but
one case (Public Administration for GROSS63), confirming the appropriateness of the FGLS
approach over OLS with either set of data.
17  For the remaining tests, the residuals from the
FGLS estimates are used as estimates of discretionary accruals, where BOOKDA represents
discretionary book accruals, and LINE28DA and GROSS63DA represent taxable income accruals
estimated, respectively, using tax return or financial statement information.
Table 6 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients of the FGLS discretionary accruals
estimated at the industry level, and then pooled.  Coefficients in bold were estimated within the
same system of equations.  Within the first system, which uses tax return information, the
correlation of financial and tax discretionary accruals is 0.472 and statistically significant. 
GROSS63, however, yields a much lower correlation (0.071) within the sample.  The estimates of
BOOKDA across the two systems are highly correlated (0.993), and LINE28DA is nearly equally18Given the difference in total accruals is derived from the amount of the book-tax income difference it is
possible that the difference in discretionary accruals is also determined by the magnitude of reported income
difference.  For System 1, the correlation of the difference in discretionary accruals between book and tax to the
aggregate  book-tax income difference is only 0.140, and 0.090 for System 2. 
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correlated with BOOKDA in each model (0.472 and 0.466).  Of note, the correlation between
LINE28DA and GROSS63DA is only 0.072.
18
Table 7 presents the full sample results from estimating equation (8), the effect of book
discretionary accruals on tax discretionary accruals.  Because firms potentially face immediate
costs in recognizing income increasing accruals for tax and immediate benefits in recognizing
income decreasing accruals, the specification of equation (8) allows for the explicit testing of
this asymmetry.  While "0 provides the intercept for the entire sample,  "1 is the coefficient on a
separate binary variable equal to one if the observation has negative taxable income, and controls
for any difference in mean discretionary accruals of negative taxable income firms. To allow for
differences in the pattern of income increasing and income decreasing accruals the discretionary
accruals variable, BOOK28DA is split into two based on sign, BOOK28DA>0 and BOOK28DA<0,
and potential differences in their effects can be  tested by comparing the coefficients on each
variable, $1 and $2.  Since the tax costs of a taxable income increasing accrual are smaller for
firms with negative tax net income an additional variable is included that interacts the
discretionary accrual variables (BOOK28DA>0 and BOOK28DA<0) with a binary variable equal to
one if the firm has negative tax net income.  The coefficients on these variables,  (1 and (2, are
estimates of the additional effect tax status has on the reflection of book discretionary accruals in
tax discretionary accruals.  The combined effects of $1 + (1 and  $2 +(2 can be compared to test if
tax status has a statistically different effect on accruals behavior.
Given the systematic differences in the data taken from tax returns and that from19While the data used in Column (2)  are collected from public sources, inclusion in the sample is based on
proprietary knowledge of the firm's tax consolidation.  The similarity in consolidation should bias any empirical
results to be more similar than would be expected without the constraint, and as such provides an upper bound on the
similarity in results that a researcher would obtain if restricted to using publicly available data.   
20The implied amount of additional tax paid, calculated as the estimated coefficient for taxable firms (0.341)
multiplied by the statutory tax rate (0.35), is 0.119, similar to the value found by Erickson et al. (2002).  This
calculation is also an aggregate estimate of Shackelford et al. (2007) parameter of interest, (M2 - *M3)/M1,
representing the cash flow effects owing to taxation of reporting additional book income.  The results here, and in
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financial statements, Equation (8) is estimated for two sets of data: in Column (1) the estimation
uses matched tax and financial statement data while in Column (2) the estimation is performed
using publicly-available data only.  This side-by-side comparison provides an easy was to assess
the effects of the differences in data on the outcome of the estimation.
19   In both equations  "0 is
positive and significant, and "1 is negative and significant, implying that firms that are not
taxable have, on average, lower (and negative) discretionary tax accruals.
The test of a central question of this paper,  whether income increasing and decreasing
discretionary book accruals are reflected to the same extent in taxable income, is found in the
coefficient estimates for $1 and  $2.  Both sets of data yield the same result: discretionary
accruals that increase book income are reflected to a lesser extent in taxable income than
discretionary accruals that reduce book income ($1 <  $2).  For the tax return sample in Column
(1), the estimated coefficient for book-increasing discretionary accruals implies that for each
dollar of income increasing discretionary accrual recognized for financial reporting purposes,
taxable income is increased by 0.341 dollars.  By contrast, firms with income decreasing
accruals are estimated to reduce taxable income by 0.761 of the amount.  The relative magnitude
of these coefficients is consistent with firms either taking advantage of opportunities to
recognize greater financial reporting income when the tax reporting effects are small, or firms
minimizing the tax effects of increased financial reporting income through other mechanisms.
20the next section, show that this trade-off varies by both tax status and industry.
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Similarly, to the extent that firms recognize income decreasing accruals, they appear to be able
to take advantage of the tax system to concurrently reduce taxable income.   For the financial
statement-only data, reported in Column (2) the results are statistically identical.
The next two coefficients, (1 and  (2, capture the incremental effects of a firm having 
negative taxable income on the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  For the tax return sample,
the coefficient on book income increasing accruals ((1) is 0.552, implying that a much greater
share of each dollar of additional book income, a total of 0.893 (0.341 + 0.552),  is reflected in
taxable income when a firm is able to recognize the additional taxable income with little or no
change in their tax liability.  In the case of income decreasing accruals the estimate of  (2 is         
-0.519, implying that a smaller portion of the decrease in book income is reflected on a firm’s tax
return when they are unable to benefit from a concurrent reduction in taxable income.  The F-
tests of the equality of coefficients are provided at the bottom of the table, and show the
differences between the coefficients on the accruals variables,  $1 and $2, and the accruals
variables interacted with tax status,  $1 + (1 and  $2 +(2, are statistically significant.  
Reflecting the difficulties in identifying non-taxable firms documented in Tables 1
through 3, the inferences from (1 and  (2 differ across the two samples.  In particular, (2, which
captures the effect of an income decreasing book accrual on taxable income for a loss firm is 2.5
times the magnitude reported in Column (1) (-1.316 v -0.519), and the sum of $2 and (2 is -0.555,
implying that book decreasing discretionary accruals are associated with increases in taxable
income in the same period.  Further, the adjusted R
2 in the public data sample is substantially
lower than in the tax return matched sample, 0.04 versus 0.28. 21This result is consistent with, but more general, than Calegari (2000), who found that firms use accruals
with low book-tax conformity to manage book earnings and high conformity to manage tax. The results here show
the degree of conformity between book and tax accruals depends on the tax status of the firm.
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In summary, the aggregate results provide evidence that income-decreasing accruals are
reflected to a greater degree on the tax return than income increasing accruals when the tax
savings from such decreases are the greatest  ($2 > $1).  However, when tax costs are reduced
owing to a current period loss, income-increasing accruals are contemporaneously reflected to a
greater degree in current taxable income  ($1 + (1 > $2 +(2).
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B.  Industry effects
Heterogeneity in accounting rules and/or practices suggests that the aggregate results
described above may not be representative of every industry.   To explore possible differences
across industries Table 8 provides separate results for the non-manufacturing and manufacturing
sectors along with a number of subindustries (nine subindustries for nonmanufacturing  and
nineteen for manufacturing).
The first column of Table 8, Panel A, provides aggregate results for non-manufacturing
firms, and are similar to the results for the entire sample.  The estimated coefficient for book
income increasing discretionary accruals (BOOK28DA>0) implies that for each dollar of income
increasing discretionary accrual recognized for financial reporting purposes, taxable income is
increased by only 0.348 dollars.  By contrast, firms with income decreasing accruals are
estimated to reduce taxable income by 1.042 of the amount.  Similar to the results reported in
Table 7, the coefficient estimates are consistent with income increasing and decreasing
discretionary accruals being reflected differently in taxable income, and that firms recognize24
greater financial reporting income when the tax reporting effects are small.  Similarly, when
firms recognize income decreasing accruals, they appear to be able to take advantage of the tax
system to concurrently reduce taxable income.  The effects of tax status ((1 and (2) are  also
similar to those reported for the entire sample, with income increasing accruals being reflected to
a much greater extent on the tax return when the tax costs are low (0.926 versus 0.337).
Columns 2 through 10 of Panel A provide the results for each two-digit SIC non-
manufacturing industry group. In all cases,  $1, the coefficient on BOOK28DA>0 is positive and
statistically significant, and ranges from 0.230 (services) to 1.034 (wholesale trade).  Consistent
with expectations, regulated industries has a coefficient statistically indistinguishable from one
(0.985), consistent with a close regulatory ties between financial and tax reporting of positive
accruals. For  $2, the coefficient on income decreasing accruals, all of the coefficients are
positive and all but two (for Mineral Industries and Public Administration) are significant.  In
four of the nine industries the hypothesis that $1 = $2 cannot be accepted, and in three of those
four industries (Agriculture, Minerals, Regulated Industries)  $1 > $2.  Only in Services is $2
estimated to be significantly greater than $1.
The effects of negative taxable income also differ across the industries.  For income
increasing accrual firms  (1 is significant in five of the nine industries, but positive in only one,
Services, suggesting that the aggregate result may be strongly influenced by this industry
(Services comprise 30 percent of the sample).  The coefficient on the interaction of negative
taxable income with income decreasing accruals is negative and significant in two of the
industries (Construction and Services) and positive and significant in Regulated Industries.
With respect to the combined coefficients,  $1 + (1 and  $2 +(2, only two of the industries’25
combined  coefficients are estimated to be statistically different, Regulated Industries and
Services.  For Regulated Industries, income increasing accruals of firms with positive taxable
income ($1 = 0.985), and income decreasing accruals of firms with negative taxable income ($2
+(2 = 1.025)  are statistically indistinguishable.
Panels B and C of Table 5 provide estimates for the manufacturing sector in total, and
separately for each of the 19 sub-industries.  While both $1 and  $2 for the manufacturing sample
(Column (1)) are positive, as in prior tables, they are not statistically distinguishable from each
other.  However, the sum of the coefficients of $1 + (1 and  $2 +(2 are significantly different, and
are consistent with both the aggregate results and those reported for non-manufacturing firms.  
In sum, for the manufacturing sector as a whole, as for the aggregate non-manufacturing sector,
income decreasing accruals are reflected differently on the tax return than income increasing
accruals, with income increasing accruals reflected on the tax return to a greater extent when the
tax cost of doing so is small.  As in the non-manufacturing industries, income decreasing
accruals are reflected less on the tax return when the firm has a tax loss than when it is currently
taxable.
Examining the individual industries, all but one of the estimates of  $1 are positive and
significant, with the exception of Leather which is not significant, and has only 13 observations. 
All but three of the estimates of $2 (Leather, Instruments, and Paper) are significant, and all are
positive.  Comparing  $1 to $2, in eleven of the nineteen industries the coefficients are not
statistically different from each other.  In the remaining eight, in all but one industry (Electrical
Equipment)  $1 is larger than $2, opposite the result found in the aggregate, and implying that for
these industries increases in book income are reflected to a greater degree in taxable income than26
decreases.
Examining the effects of the interaction with tax status,  $1 + (1 and  $2 +(2, the sums of
the coefficients are estimated to be statistically different in 5 of the 19 industries, and in all but
one of the five the results are consistent with the aggregate results for manufacturing: book
income increasing accruals are reflected in taxable income to a greater extent when the tax cost
is small.  The exception, Transportation Equipment, yields a large negative coefficient on (1,
implying that increases in book accruals are associated with contemporaneous decreases in
taxable income of firms that already have negative taxable income.
Taken together, the results of Table 8 provide evidence that financial reporting
discretionary accruals and tax discretionary accruals are related, that the relation varies
significantly by industry, and that income increasing book accruals are reflected less in taxable
income than income decreasing accruals unless the tax costs are small.  The extent of the inter-
industry differences can be significant, and suggest that empirical analyses should allow for
differences in the conformity of book and tax reporting beyond the common practice of omitting
regulated industries (because they are asserted as being highly conforming) and financial
institutions (because of their general accounting differences).  Similar to controlling for country
differences in book-tax conformity in the international literature (e.g., Hung, 2000), the
coefficient estimates in Table 8 provide a set of variables that can be used to control for cross-
sectional differences in conformity in empirical accounting research using  Compustat or other
U.S. data.
Eliminating the use of proprietary data, Table 9 presents the estimated relation between
book and tax accruals when a financial statement-based measure of taxable income is used in27
place of the tax return data.  For this table, the same methodology used in Table 8 was repeated
with GROSS63 substituted for the tax return measure of tax net income, beginning with the joint
estimation of equations (6) and (7).   From the estimation of the system of equations, the
correlation matrix of the residuals are reported in the last column of Table 6, along with their
significance.  Similar to System 1, the statistical significance of the  correlation of the residuals
supports the conclusion that FGLS is a more appropriate method to estimate the total accruals
model than single equation OLS.
The contrast to the results presented in Table 8 can be seen by comparing the aggregate
results for non-manufacturing and manufacturing from Panels A and B of each table. 
Qualitatively, and quantitatively, the results for non-manufacturing industries are quite similar,
with  $1 < $2 and  ($1 + (1) > ($2 +(2).  For manufacturing, the aggregate results are more difficult
to compare, with significant differences in both the magnitude of the coefficients (especially
those on the terms interacted with negative taxable income) and the F-tests of the differences in
coefficients. It is also worth noting that the adjusted R
2 of the non-manufacturing and
manufacturing totals are substantially lower in Table 9 than in Table 8.
The most important conclusion from examining Table 9 is not related to the significance
of individual coefficient estimates in each industry, but the general result that financial
statement-based measures of tax discretionary accruals do not provide the same inferences about
firm behavior as suggested by the underlying tax return data.  While the joint estimation of a
financial statement -based tax accruals model with a financial statement measure of book
accruals yields more efficient estimates of the parameters of an accruals model, a result that has
methodological implications for estimating accruals models generally,  the residuals from the tax28
equation will not yield comparable results to those that would be obtained from the use of tax
return data.  This lack of similarity is particularly noteworthy given that the consolidation rules
imposed on the sample made the two samples more, rather than less, homogeneous. 
C.  The financial reporting costs of tax minimizing behavior
Up to this point, I have focused on the relation of financial reporting to tax reporting. 
However, from a tax policy perspective, numerous factors (such as greater disparities in book-
tax differences over time, suggestions of increased tax sheltering activities, and most recently the
reports on Enron’s tax practices by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2003) and the Senate’s
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2003)) have highlighted the abilities of firms to
aggressively manage their tax reporting income using transactions that affect only taxable
income, with no (or very little ) consequence for the amount of pretax income reported to
shareholders.  Bankman (1999) provides anecdotal evidence on a variety of tax shelter schemes
that do not reduce book income.   Weisbach (2001), in commenting on the proliferation of tax
reduction activities of concern to the U.S. Treasury argues that "[v]irtually no shelters in the
current market reduce book income."  According to the JCT (2003) report, twelve Enron
transactions between 1995 and 2001 yielded more than $2 billion in additional financial
accounting income through reductions in the tax expense.
While Enron’s ability to separately manipulate its book and taxable income is striking, it
might be considered an outlier given the spectacular collapse of the company.  However, from
both a financial and tax reporting perspective, the mechanisms used by Enron are not particularly
exotic, and many are widely marketed “retail” schemes.  Bankman (2003) reports that the ability29
to engage in aggressive tax shelters has not only become more available generally, but that such
tax sheltering activities, even those with a very high chance of detection, remain profitable even
if detected and resolved through a settlement agreement with the IRS.  This anecdotal evidence
on firm behavior suggests the statistical relations documented above for the contemporaneous
behavior of the tax return to financial statements may not be symmetric in reverse.  While the
incentive to report less income to tax authorities leads to the prediction that income increasing
book accruals will have smaller coefficients than income decreasing book accruals, the opposite
will be true of tax motivated transactions.  If the tax return is the starting point, then recent
experience with tax shelters implies that tax income increasing discretionary accruals will be
reflected in financial statements, while discretionary accruals that decease taxable income will
not.
To test this, equation (8) is estimated with BOOKDA as the dependent variable and the
change in discretionary tax accruals (LINE28DA or GROSS63DA) as the explanatory variable with
the results for the pooled data presented in Table 10.  In contrast to Table 7, where the
coefficient on income increasing book accruals was found to have a smaller effect on taxable
income than income decreasing accruals, the magnitude of the estimates of $1 and  $2 are
reversed, and statistically different, with  $1 > $2  (1.247 >0.571).  These coefficients imply that
income tax increasing accruals are reflected to a higher degree in book income than accruals that
decrease taxable income.  This relation is consistent with the firms being willing to pay higher
taxes if they are concurrently reporting higher income to their shareholders, or, alternatively, that
firms that increase their taxable income do so in a manner than conforms with financial
reporting.   30
 Firms with negative taxable income can increase their current year taxable income
without generating additional tax liability, and decreases to their income will not provide
immediate additional tax savings.  However, for negative taxable income firms, taxable income
increasing accruals are reflected less in current book income than taxable income decreasing
accruals (0.350 versus 0.637).  This implies that the nature of income decreasing accruals taken
by firms with negative taxable income are generally more conforming with financial accounting
rules than other accruals.  However, as will be shown in the disaggregated industry results to
follow, this counterintuitive result is driven by the Services industry, which comprises 17 percent
of the sample.  Excluding Services, the point estimate for with  $1 still exceeds  $2  (0.908 versus
0.760) and $1 + (1 is also greater than $2 +(2 (0.451 versus 0.444), but the differences are not
statistically significant.  
The results from the use of publicly available data, presented in Column (2), present a
starkly different picture than those using tax return information.  Neither of the discretionary
accruals variables ($1 and $2) are statistically significant and the interaction of income increasing
accruals and NEGTI ((1) is estimated to have a value of 0.994, implying that the incremental
effect for a firm currently experiencing a tax loss is to reflect all of the increase in taxable
income in current period financial reporting income.  While this result, as well as the results of
the combined coefficients ($1 + (1 and $2 +(2) are consistent with expectations, they are not
consistent with the tax return results.  As is Table 7, the R
2 in reported in Column (2) is much
smaller than reported in Column (1) for the matched tax return sample.
Table 11 provides industry-level results for the financial reporting effects of tax
discretionary accruals, paralleling those presented in Table 8 for non-manufacturing and31
manufacturing industries.  The aggregate results for non-manufacturing industries are presented
in Panel (A), Column (1), and are similar to the aggregate results reported in Table 10, with  $1 >
$2 (1.445 >0.466) and a large, negative, estimate for  (1, consistent with taxable income
increasing accruals being reflected to a larger extent in financial reporting income, but that
negative current period taxable income significantly reduces the effect ((1 = -1.117), and
increases the amount of taxable income decreasing accruals reflected in financial reporting
income ((2 = 0.533).  Service industry firms comprise 30 percent of the non-manufacturing
sample total, and as in the aggregate results presented in Table 10, have a significant effect on
the industry results.  Excluding the service industry (not reported in the table), the point estimate
for $1 still exceeds  $2  (0.923 versus 0.707), a difference that is significantly significant, but  the
point estimates for $1 + (1 and $2 + (2 are statistically indistinguishable (0.766 versus 0.840).   
While the aggregate results for non-manufacturing firms are consistent with the
hypothesis that taxable income increasing accruals are reflected to a greater degree in book
income than income decreasing accruals, the effects clearly vary by industry, as shown in
Columns (2) through (10).    In eight of the nine non-manufacturing industries, the point estimate
for $1 exceeds  $2 (Agriculture is the exception), but the difference is statistically significant in
only three industries (Agriculture, FIRE, and Services).  Similarly, the point estimates for $1 + (1
and $2 + (2 are statistically distinguishable in only three industries (Agriculture, Construction,
and FIRE).
Panels (B) and ( C) provide the disaggregated results for manufacturing firms.  In
contrast to the results for the non-manufacturing sector, the point estimates for the manufacturing
sector as a whole are consistent with the hypothesis that taxable income increasing accruals are32
reflected to a greater degree in book income regardless of their current tax status, but the
coefficients between the groups are not statistically distinguishable. Similar to Table 8, eight of
the 19 manufacturing industries have statistically different coefficients for $1 and $2 and five
industries for ($1 + (1) versus ($2 +(2).  Point estimates for twelve of the nineteen industries are
consistent with there being greater conformity for taxable income increasing accruals when firms
have negative taxable income (and therefore face lower costs to increase taxable income),
including the five industry groups contributing 68 percent of the observations (Chemicals,
Electrical Equipment, Instruments, Industrial Machinery, and Food) 
The general conclusions to be drawn from Table 11 are that accruals that increase taxable
income, and for which there is an additional  tax cost, tend to be more conforming, with an
increase in book income of  0.887 of the amount for manufacturing firms, and 1.445 for non-
manufacturing firms.  With respect to decreases in income, manufacturing firms appear to be
more conforming than non-manufacturing (0.827 versus 0.466).  While there are significant
exceptions within the manufacturing sector, the effect of tax status on the conformity of accruals
appears to be more pronounced in non-manufacturing industries than in manufacturing.
7.  Conclusions
The extent of the trade-off between financial and tax reporting is an important issue in
understanding firms’ behavior, and in the current policy debate over the adequacy of firms’
disclosures of tax related information.  Using a matched sample of financial statements with tax
returns I estimate the extent to which discretionary financial reporting accruals are correlated
with discretionary tax accruals.  The methodology takes advantage of the contemporaneous33
nature of financial and tax reporting to mitigate the econometric problems identified in earlier
earnings management studies.  There are two broad conclusions from this work.
First, with respect to recent policy discussions regarding the need for greater disclosure
of tax return information, the results show that financial statement disclosures under FAS 109 do 
not convey sufficient information to adequately estimate key aspects of a firm’s tax attributes,
such as the current year tax liability.  While the disclosure of some information from the tax
return might address this issue, changes to the financial accounting disclosures under FAS109
may be equally effective.
Second, I find the degree to which tax reporting is affected by discretionary financial
reporting varies significantly by industry, profitability, and by the sign of discretionary accruals.
These results show that managers are able to undertake substantial book income increasing
activities without being subject to immediate tax reporting costs, consistent with recent evidence
on the differential growth of book and tax income and with tax sheltering activities.  Further, the
extent to which tax discretionary accruals are affected by book discretionary accruals varies by
both the sign of the accrual and the firm’s tax status, consistent with the nature of discretionary
accruals being such that managers can opportunistically mitigate the tax consequences of such
activities, such as by recognizing more earnings when the tax costs are low. 
There are a number of extensions to these results for future research to address.  First,
industry-based studies are commonplace, and while the results show aggregate differences by
industry, the specific characteristics of individual firms are likely to be important in determining
the reporting tradeoffs of firms.  As a result, future research on the components of book tax
differences can provide additional information on specific reporting choices, and whether their34
reporting tradeoffs are likely to be high or low.
Second, evidence of earnings management has been derived from the distribution of
earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), and Phillips et al. (2003) have shown the deferred tax
expense is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management.  The results of this paper,
while addressing the link between income reported under each system, does not address how
such differences affect the reporting of current and deferred tax expenses.   The results do
support the importance of additional research on the components of deferred taxes by
documenting the lack of similarity in results when aggregate financial reporting data is used in
place of tax return information.
Separately, the paper provides a new methodological approach to address concerns with
discretionary accruals-based earnings management.  Easier to implement than the instrumental
variables approach suggested by Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), it takes advantage of the
contemporaneous determination of financial and tax income to control for omitted variables.35
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Table 1
Comparison of Financial Statement and Tax Return Data
(A) (B) © (D) (E) (F)


















Tax Total Assets 1,552.34
(11,682.14)
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This table presents the financial and tax reporting values, respectively, of data obtained from SEC 10-K filings and IRS Form 1120.  Book Total
Assets is taken from Compustat (data item 6);, Tax Total Assets is taken from the IRS Form 1120, Schedule L.  Book Total Revenues (Compustat
data item 2) and Tax Gross Receipts (IRS Form 1120, page 1) are the amounts of receipts reported to shareholders and tax authorities,
respectively.  Pre-tax Book income for financial reporting purposes is measured as Compustat data item 170; the tax return value is taken from the
IRS Form 1120, Schedule M-1.  Estimated taxable income is based information available in Compustat and is defined as the Current Tax Expense
(data item 63) grossed-up by the year’s maximum corporate tax rate, adjusted for the change in Net Operating Loss (NOL, data item 52).  Tax Net
Income is derived from line 28 of the tax return, further reduced by the amount of special deductions.  Income Subject to Tax, Tax Before, and
Tax After, Credits are all taken from the tax return.
Column (A) presents the means and standard deviation of the book and tax variables from the unconstrained sample.  Column (B) presents the
results of t-tests where H0 tests that the book value - the tax value is equal to zero.   Column ( C) presents the means and standard deviations of a
sample matched on firms’ reported total assets only and Column (E) from the constrained sample used in the  estimation of the accruals models. 
Columns (D) and (F) present the t-tests of the means of the constrained sample variables.  Significance levels: ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10
percent. 
 
†Owing to missing values for Compustat data item 63 the sample sizes for the current tax expense are reduced.  15,496 observations were used in
Column © and 5,392in Column (E).41
Table 2
Sign Errors in Financial Statement-Based Measures of Taxable Income
Cell Entries of Percent of total Sample Falling into Each Category
Sign of 
Estimated Taxable Income (GROSS63)
#0> 0
Sign of 


















Sign Errors in Financial Statement-Based Measures of Tax Liability





#0> 0 #0> 0
Sign of data63
Current Income Taxes -
Federal
(N= 37,853)
#0 38.51 1.81 35.91 4.40
>0 12.71 46.97 6.55 53.14
Misclassification 14.52 10.95
Sign of data63
Current Income Taxes -
Federal
(N = 17,617)
#0 40.46 0.73 38.22 2.97
>0 16.04 42.77 8.72 50.09
Misclassification 16.77 11.69
Sign of data63
Current Income Taxes - Federal
(N = 6,062)
#0 39.57 0.61 37.53 2.66
>0 15.31 44.51 8.40 51.42
Misclassification 15.92 11.0643
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Accrual Sample
    
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations (6,062 observations)
Variable (Compustat data item) Mean Std. Dev.
Total Assets (data item 6) 612.27 3,125.30
Sales (data item 12) 489.30 1,798.83
Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment (data
item 7)
424.07 1,989.67
Book Pretax Income (data item 170) 23.81 244.66
Tax Net Income  15.74 165.56
Cash Flows (data item 308 - data item126) 41.970 249.300
Book Total Accruals, scaled (TAF) -0.067 0.375
Tax Total Accruals, scaled (TAT) -0.052 0.230




















Definitions: Total accruals are defined as either Pretax Book or Tax Net Income less pretax Operating Cash Flows. 
GROSS63 federal income taxes grossed-up by the statutory tax rate, line28 tax net income (net income before net operating
loss deduction and special deductions).    BOOKTA  is scaled total accruals derived from firms’ 10-Ks,   LINE28TA and
GROSS63TA are scaled total accruals for Tax Net Income and Estimated Taxable Income, respectively. 
1Correlations between pretax book income and tax net income are for 6,062 observations, 5,392 for grossed-up federal
income taxes; all correlations are significant at 1%.44
Table 5
Correlation of Accruals Residuals, Pooled and by Industry
(Standard deviations in parentheses)
Mnemonic Industry SIC Observations
Correlation matrix of residuals from









All Complete Sample 6,062 0.503 0.116
Agric Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 01 - 09 20 0.962 -0.435
Mineral Mineral Industries 10-14 304 0.667 0.377
Constr Construction Industries 15-17 77 0.891 0.741
Mfg Manufacturing 20-39 2,638 0.625 0.584
RegInds Transportation, Communication, and Utilities 41-49 766 0.603 0.696
Whole Wholesale Trade 50-51 320 0.920 0.903
Retail Retail Trade 52-59 663 0.741 0.570
FIRE Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 60-67 226 0.870 0.665
Service Service Industries 70-89 1,028 0.647 0.443
PubAdm Public Administration 91-97 20 0.460 -0.332
A total of 64 2-digit SIC industry regressions were estimated.  The correlations in the table are average for the 2-digit SIC estimates within each 1-digit SIC industry.  For
System 1, all but two of the 2-digit correlations are statistically significant at at least 10 percent (SIC 31 Leather, SIC 47 transportation Services) and only 2 are not significant
at at least 0.001.  For System 2, all but four of the 2-digit correlations are statistically significant at at least 10 percent (SIC 29 Petroleum, SIC 38 Instruments, SIC 75 Auto
Repair, SIC 90 not elsewhere classified)  and of the remaining all but 6 are significant at at least 0.001.45
Table 6
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Discretionary Accruals Estimates
        


















Variable definitions: BOOKDA is the estimate of book discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the accruals equation
(Equation (6)), LINE28DA is the estimate of taxable income discretionary accruals, defined as the residual of Equation (7) using the
matched tax return sample.  GROSS63DA is the estimate of tax discretionary accruals defined from the residual of Equation (7) 
using only financial statement data.
 
***Significant at 1 percent.  Bold entries are correlations from within the same estimation
system sizes 6,062 for System 1, 5226 for remaining.46
Table 7
The Reflection of Book Discretionary Accruals in Tax Discretionary Accruals, Pooled Sample
(1) (2)
  Matched Tax and Financial Statement 
Financial Data Only
"0  INTERCEPT 0.031*** 0.009*
(0.008) (0.005)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.098*** -0.142**
       (NEGTI) (0.013) (0.064)
$1  DAF>0 0.341*** 0.229***
(0.102) (0.048)
$2  DAF<0 0.761*** 0.761***
(0.119) (0.131)
(1 (DAF>0)*NEGTI 0.552*** 0.839***
(0.150) (0.289)
(2  (DAF<0)*NEGTI -0.519*** -1.316**
(0.147) (0.005)
Observations 6,062 5,226
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
$1 + (1 0.893 1.068
$2 +(2 0.242 -0.555
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 5.37** 13.28***
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 17.80*** 4.89**
Variable definitions: NEGTI is a binary variable equal to one if the firms reports (or is inferred to have) negative taxable
income in the current year, zero otherwise. DAF is the measure of scaled discretionary accruals for financial reporting
income), and is separated into two variables, (DAF >0, DAF <0) depending on the sign of the discretionary accrual.  DAF
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Table 8
The Reflection of Book Discretionary Accruals in Tax Discretionary Accruals, Industry Results
PANEL A: NON-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
  All Agric Mineral Constr RegInds Whole Retail FIRE Service      PubAdmin
"0  INTERCEPT 0.032*** -0.001 -0.025* -0.006 -0.010*** 0.006 0.000 0.017** 0.046*** 0.104
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.113)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.086*** -0.026 0.004 -0.010 0.039*** -0.005 -0.028 -0.023 -0.132*** -0.158
       (NEGTI) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.129)
$1  BOOK28DA>0 0.348*** 1.018*** 0.843*** 0.917*** 0.985*** 1.034*** 0.753*** 0.918*** 0.230***       0.353***
(0.122) (0.095) (0.118) (0.042) (0.073) (0.112) (0.145) (0.046) (0.041) (0.099)
$2  BOOK28DA<0 1.042*** 0.540*** 0.203 1.012*** 0.361*** 1.161*** 0.735*** 1.050*** 1.190*** 0.068
(0.104) (0.162) (0.159) (0.140) (0.128) (0.085) (0.087) (0.166) (0.251) (0.192)
(1  (BOOK28DA>0)*NEGTI 0.578*** -0.316* -0.371** -0.730*** -0.655*** -0.096 -0.107 -0.044 0.882*** -0.186
(0.204) (0.168) (0.180) (0.250) (0.173) (0.204) (0.217) (0.078) (0.225) (0.113)
(2  (BOOK28DA<0)*NEGTI -0.705*** 0.115 0.185 -0.492** 0.664*** -0.107 -0.382 -0.073 -0.958*** 0.000
(0.148) (0.277) (0.180) (0.195) (0.153) (0.133) (0.278) (0.188) (0.270) (0.000)
Observations 3424 20 304 77 766 320 663 226 1028 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 0.93 0.42 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.48 0.77 0.34 0.18
$1 + (1 0.926 0.702 0.472 0.187 0.330 0.938 0.646 0.874 1.112 0.167
$2 +(2 0.337 0.655 0.388 0.520 1.025 1.054 0.353 0.977 0.232 0.068
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 12.11*** 5.32** 7.56*** 0.41 15.53*** 0.59 0.01 0.49 13.54*** 1.74
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PANEL B: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 2000 - 2999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Food Textile Apparel Lumber Furniture Paper Printing Chemicals Petrole
um
"0  INTERCEPT 0.035** 0.004 0.013* -0.002 -0.008 0.005 -0.027* 0.008* 0.002 -0.016
(0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.004) (0.025) (0.012)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.120*** -0.110 -0.022* -0.001 -0.047*** -0.117** 0.022 -0.035 -0.077** -0.005
       (NEGTI) (0.018) (0.076) (0.013) (0.037) (0.012) (0.045) (0.027) (0.051) (0.034) (0.041)
$1  BOOK28DA>0 0.314* 0.844*** 0.682*** 1.073*** 0.965*** 0.984*** 0.613*** 0.892*** 0.879***         1.054***
(0.190) (0.028) (0.115) (0.100) (0.188) (0.135) (0.159) (0.122) (0.126) (0.327)
$2  BOOK28DA<0 0.571*** 0.513*** 0.804** 0.839*** 0.620** 1.254*** -0.256 0.875*** 0.379***         0.707***
(0.124) (0.147) (0.334) (0.085) (0.231) (0.291) (0.277) (0.023) (0.092) (0.149)
(1  (BOOK28DA>0)*NEGTI 0.558** -0.293* 0.280 0.096 0.009 1.820*** -0.461** -1.876 -0.228 -1.060
(0.229) (0.151) (0.168) (0.230) (0.188) (0.593) (0.225) (1.139) (0.310) (1.107)
(2  (BOOK28DA<0)*NEGTI -0.482*** -0.417 0.106 0.435* -0.414* -1.186*** 0.649* -0.936 -0.352***        -0.937**
(0.140) (0.359) (0.350) (0.227) (0.231) (0.421) (0.325) (0.570) (0.098) (0.365)
Observations 2638 170 44 55 31 32 68 96 630 32
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.27 0.87 0.92 0.69 0.84 0.31 0.42 0.13 0.25
$1 + (1 0.872 0.551 0.962 1.169 0.974 2.804 0.152 -0.984 0.651 -0.006
$2 +(2 0.089 0.096 0.910 1.274 0.206 0.068 0.393 -0.061 0.027 -0.230
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 0.92 4.34** 0.11 2.42 0.85 0.50 4.81** 0.02 7.80*** 0.61
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 26.55*** 1.19 0.07 0.07 21.16*** 10.08*** 0.90 0.45 4.59** 0.0349
PANEL C: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 3000 - 3999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rubber Leather Stone Primary Fabricated Industrial Electrical Transportation Instruments Misc
Mfg
Metals Metals Machinery Equipment Equipment
"0  INTERCEPT 0.003 -0.018 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 -0.025* 0.046*** -0.011* -0.027** 0.000
(0.008) (0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.003 -0.171** -0.036 -0.017 -0.019* 0.007 -0.108** 0.023* -0.056** 0.019
       (NEGTI) (0.014) (0.071) (0.047) (0.013) (0.011) (0.030) (0.049) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
$1  BOOK28DA>0 0.976*** 0.039 1.107*** 0.886*** 0.977*** 1.042*** 0.109* 1.022*** 1.006***       0.932***
(0.178) (0.931) (0.121) (0.054) (0.080) (0.103) (0.057) (0.055) (0.121) (0.080)
$2  BOOK28DA<0 0.995*** -0.875 0.875*** 0.475** 0.882*** 0.116* 0.499*** 0.691*** 0.289            0.890***
(0.140) (0.938) (0.120) (0.207) (0.106) (0.068) (0.163) (0.121) (0.190) (0.231)
(1  (BOOK28DA>0)*NEGTI -0.176 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.255 -0.031 0.957*** -3.199*** -0.105 -1.028
(0.221) (0.000) (0.000) (0.295) (0.255) (0.107) (0.180) (0.985) (0.255) (0.715)
(2  (BOOK28DA<0)*NEGTI 0.037 0.000 -0.408 -0.056 -0.155 0.759*** -0.114 0.273* -0.251 0.115
(0.154) (0.000) (0.522) (0.232) (0.177) (0.119) (0.421) (0.159) (0.205) (0.320)
Observations 63 13 37 139 74 254 443 103 296 58
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.00 0.80 0.68 0.89 0.64 0.17 0.87 0.18 0.76
$1 + (1 0.800 0.039 1.107 0.881 0.722 1.011 1.066 -2.177 0.901 -0.096
$2 +(2 1.032 -0.875 0.467 0.419 0.727 0.875 0.385 0.964 0.038 1.005
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 0.01 0.31 1.37 2.84* 0.33 39.72*** 4.83** 4.92** 7.82*** 0.03
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 2.05 0.31 1.50 1.82 0.00 1.42 2.03 9.66*** 12.35*** 1.76
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
See Table 7 for a description of the variables.50
Table 9
The Reflection of Book Discretionary Accruals in Tax Discretionary Accruals - Financial Statement Measures 
PANEL A: NON-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Agric Mineral Constr RegInds Whole Retail FIRE Service     PubAdmin
"0  INTERCEPT 0.009** 0.033 -0.058** -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013*** 0.026* -0.003 -0.268***
(0.004) (0.032) (0.028) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.000)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.061*** -0.009 0.074** -0.015 0.013 -0.005 0.003 -0.081 -0.080 0.094
       (NEGTI) (0.022) (0.046) (0.034) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.076) (0.054) (0.118)
$1  BOOK63DA>0 0.243*** -1.012 0.665*** 0.883*** 0.444*** 0.815*** 0.790*** 0.858*** 0.200***       0.056***
(0.038) (0.775) (0.221) (0.078) (0.081) (0.085) (0.060) (0.105) (0.009) (0.000)
$2  BOOK63DA<0 1.028*** 0.609* 1.391*** 1.039*** 0.731*** 0.737*** 0.668*** 0.988*** 1.643***     -19.102***
(0.136) (0.327) (0.530) (0.208) (0.130) (0.082) (0.074) (0.113) (0.419) (0.000)
(1  BOOK63DA>0*NEGTI 0.738** 0.406 -0.103 0.010 0.052 -0.149 -0.161 0.175 1.056* -0.049
(0.352) (0.880) (0.275) (0.172) (0.110) (0.101) (0.306) (0.140) (0.564) (0.103)
(2  BOOK63DA<0*NEGTI -0.982*** -1.112 -1.124** -0.722*** -0.305** -0.067 -0.432** -0.300 -1.655***    18.385***
(0.152) (0.654) (0.552) (0.226) (0.146) (0.104) (0.210) (0.234) (0.424) (0.718)
Observations 2913 16 221 68 696 270 563 175 884 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 -0.06 0.24 0.67 0.49 0.80 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.13
$1 + (1 0.981 -0.606 0.562 0.893 0.496 0.666 0.629 1.033 1.256 0.007
$2 +(2 0.046 -0.503 0.267 0.317 0.426 0.670 0.236 0.688 -0.012 -0.717
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 28.74*** 2.39 1.41 0.44 2.93* 0.34 1.28 0.54 11.71***
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PANEL B: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 2000 - 2999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Food Textile Apparel Lumber Furniture Paper Printing Chemicals Petroleum
"0  INTERCEPT 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.199*** 0.004 0.001 -0.014 -0.003 -0.022 -0.391***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.065) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.119) (0.127)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.267** -0.007 -0.054* -0.150 -0.022 -0.175*** 0.056 0.109 -0.165 0.552
       (NEGTI) (0.122) (0.023) (0.027) (0.233) (0.018) (0.007) (0.038) (0.119) (0.190) (0.400)
$1  BOOK63DA>0 0.187 0.429*** 0.604*** -1.635 0.724*** 0.935*** 1.167*** 0.496 -0.127 11.111**
(0.121) (0.134) (0.129) (1.259) (0.127) (0.146) (0.339) (0.451) (0.980) (4.557)
$2  BOOK63DA<0 0.560*** 0.738* 0.757*** 3.153*** 1.023*** 0.998*** 0.531** 1.019*** 0.294 -1.500
(0.150) (0.442) (0.086) (1.014) (0.194) (0.135) (0.202) (0.327) (0.195) (1.314)
(1  BOOK63DA>0*NEGTI 1.128** 0.086 0.849*** 3.225 0.000 0.000 -0.539 0.491 0.141 -12.958
(0.468) (0.136) (0.293) (2.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.435) (0.940) (1.170) (8.222)
(2  BOOK63DA<0*NEGTI -2.106* -0.178 -0.621** 0.407 -0.474** -2.443*** 0.750 0.099 -2.122* 2.963
(1.089) (0.480) (0.252) (3.870) (0.204) (0.135) (0.679) (0.960) (1.227) (5.380)
Observations 2313 128 39 55 28 29 56 81 582 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.36 0.72 0.26 0.92 0.83 0.51 0.25 0.14 -0.04
$1 + (1 1.315 0.515 1.453 1.590 0.724 0.935 0.628 0.987 0.014 -1.847
$2 +(2 -1.546 0.560 0.136 3.560 0.549 -1.445 1.281 1.118 -1.828 1.463
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 3.17* 0.41 0.76 6.31** 1.10 0.08 1.68 0.62 0.13 5.06**
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 4.02** 0.05 8.61*** 0.15 1.51 265.83*** 0.52 0.01 1.14 0.0852
PANEL C: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 3000 - 3999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rubber Leather Stone Primary Fabricated Industrial  Electrical TransportationInstruments Misc Mfg
Metals Metals Machinery Equipment Equipment
"0  INTERCEPT -0.007 0.008 0.002 -0.028* -0.005 -0.054 0.033*** -0.007 -0.093** -0.009
(0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.041) (0.012) (0.009) (0.038) (0.012)
"1  Negative Taxable Income 0.024 -0.011 -0.024*** 0.036 0.009 -0.177 -0.090** -0.025 -0.194 0.073***
       (NEGTI) (0.027) (0.020) (0.006) (0.024) (0.023) (0.151) (0.038) (0.037) (0.192) (0.027)
$1  BOOK63DA>0 0.704* 1.015*** 0.784*** 1.065*** 0.949*** 1.265*** 0.075** 0.815*** 0.836** 0.899***
(0.354) (0.142) (0.075) (0.116) (0.087) (0.260) (0.031) (0.108) (0.409) (0.172)
$2  BOOK63DA<0 0.733* 1.204*** 0.989*** 0.546** 0.884*** -0.202 0.466*** 0.819*** 0.603**            0.626***
(0.406) (0.247) (0.034) (0.275) (0.142) (0.546) (0.142) (0.104) (0.306) (0.220)
(1  BOOK63DA>0*NEGTI 0.421 0.000 1.526*** -0.652 0.159 1.073*** 0.899*** 0.631 3.585* -0.736*
(0.394) (0.000) (0.226) (0.460) (0.406) (0.321) (0.306) (1.178) (1.852) (0.393)
(2  BOOK63DA<0*NEGTI 0.221 0.000 -0.595*** -0.256 -0.159 0.210 -0.212 -0.521*** -1.172 0.826**
(0.431) (0.000) (0.043) (0.288) (0.334) (0.787) (0.322) (0.178) (0.840) (0.325)
Observations 52 13 29 108 55 226 401 83 273 51
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.97 0.96 0.36 0.79 0.09 0.12 0.64 0.04 0.73
$1 + (1 1.125 1.015 2.310 0.413 1.108 2.338 0.974 1.446 4.421 0.163
$2 +(2  0.954 1.204 0.394 0.290 0.725 0.008 0.254 0.298 -0.569 1.452
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 0.00 0.25 4.41** 2.51 0.11 4.98** 7.01*** 0.00 0.15 0.68
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 0.43 0.25 67.50*** 0.06 0.37 15.14*** 2.65* 0.84 5.34** 6.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
See Table 7 for a description of the variables.53
Table 10
Financial Reporting Effects of Tax Discretionary Accruals, Pooled Sample
(1) (2)
Matched Tax and Financial Statement 
Financial Data Only
"0  INTERCEPT -0.015 0.023**
(0.017) (0.010)
"1  Negative Taxable Income 0.002 -0.079***
      (NEGTI) (0.025) (0.016)
$1  DAT>0 1.247*** -0.124
(0.277) (0.082)
$2  DAT<0 0.571*** 0.033
(0.120) (0.024)
(1 (DAT>0)*NEGTI -0.897*** 0.994***
(0.294) (0.142)
(2  (DAT<0)*NEGTI 0.066 0.093
(0.230) (0.144)
Observations 6,062 5,226
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
$1 + (1 0.350 0.870
$2 +(2 0.637 0.126
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 5.37** 3.21*
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 17.80*** 13.06**
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is scaled discretionary financial reporting accruals.  NEGTI is a binary
variable equal to one if the firm has negative taxable income, zero otherwise.  DAT is the amount of discretionary
accruals estimated from either the tax return (LINE28DA) or imputed from the financial statement (GROSS63DA), and is
separated into two variables, (DAT >0, DAT <0) depending on the sign of the discretionary accrual.  DAT >0*NEGTI and
DAT <0*NEGTI are interaction terms of the sign of the tax discretionary accrual and tax status. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 11
Financial Reporting Effects of Tax Discretionary Accruals, Industry Results
PANEL A: NON-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)(10)
All Agric Mineral Constr RegInds Whole Retail FIRE Service PubAdmin
"0  INTERCEPT -0.022 0.006 0.034** 0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.014** -0.103    -0.102
(0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.071) (0.251)
"1  Negative Taxable Income 0.031 -0.014 -0.058** 0.013 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.021 0.120 0.285
       (NEGTI) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.087) (0.315)
$1  LINE28DA>0 1.445*** 0.905*** 0.681*** 1.008*** 0.924*** 0.893*** 0.965*** 0.929*** 2.697*** 2.094***
(0.413) (0.056) (0.121) (0.052) (0.067) (0.058) (0.048) (0.071) (0.964) (0.586)
$2  LINE28DA<0 0.466*** 1.828*** 0.514* 0.790*** 0.673*** 0.772*** 0.559** 0.738*** -0.005 1.885
(0.129) (0.328) (0.273) (0.133) (0.152) (0.056) (0.227) (0.069) (0.288) (1.125)
(1  LINE28DA>0*NEGTI -1.117*** 2.129** 0.195 -1.759*** -0.353 -0.161 -0.765 0.105 -2.426** -2.778**
(0.432) (0.873) (0.385) (0.583) (0.314) (0.202) (0.707) (0.104) (0.972) (1.200)
(2  LINE28DA<0*NEGTI 0.533* -0.935* 0.346 0.532 0.206 0.006 0.195 -0.127 1.131** 0.000
(0.302) (0.441) (0.370) (0.385) (0.153) (0.086) (0.261) (0.178) (0.565) (0.000)
Observations 3424 20 304 77 766 320 663 226 1028 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.93 0.41 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.49 0.79 0.38 0.16
$1 + (1 0.328 3.034 0.876 -0.751 0.571 0.732 0.200 1.034 0.271 -0.684
$2 +(2  0.999 0.893 0.860 1.322 0.879 0.778 0.754 0.611 1.126 1.885
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 3.41* 5.80** 0.24 1.98 2.02 1.82 2.40 2.99* 4.82** 0.03
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PANEL B: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 2000 - 2999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Food Textile Apparel Lumber Furniture Paper Printing Chemicals Petroleum
"0  INTERCEPT 0.004 -0.016** -0.005 0.005 -0.021** -0.003 -0.016 0.001 0.092*** 0.037**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.020) (0.014)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.048*** -0.098*** 0.017 0.001 0.230*** -0.083 -0.017 -0.085*** -0.114*** -0.063
       (NEGTI) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.027) (0.025) (0.077) (0.041) (0.031) (0.038) (0.037)
$1  LINE28DA>0 0.887*** 1.057*** 1.050*** 0.833*** 1.425*** 0.851*** 1.194*** 0.867*** 0.471*** 0.397***
(0.110) (0.130) (0.148) (0.042) (0.160) (0.129) (0.433) (0.068) (0.122) (0.130)
$2  LINE28DA<0 0.827*** 0.947*** 0.957*** 1.106*** 0.207 0.617*** 0.258 1.105*** 1.512*** 1.321***
(0.199) (0.142) (0.060) (0.111) (0.195) (0.184) (0.383) (0.055) (0.494) (0.398)
(1  LINE28DA>0*NEGTI -0.479*** 0.407 -0.216 -0.071 0.000 0.781 0.132 -0.588 -0.211 -0.559
(0.180) (0.769) (0.301) (0.117) (0.000) (0.783) (1.071) (0.806) (0.184) (0.393)
(2  LINE28DA<0*NEGTI -0.594*** -0.924*** 0.124 -0.336** 4.045*** -0.421 0.417 -1.444*** -1.292** -1.485**
(0.219) (0.169) (0.146) (0.157) (0.309) (0.936) (0.580) (0.119) (0.510) (0.666)
Observations 2638 170 44 55 31 32 68 96 630 32
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.49 0.85 0.92 0.87 0.77 0.24 0.59 0.04 0.33
$1 + (1 0.408 1.464 0.834 0.762 1.425 1.632 1.326 0.279 0.260 -0.162
$2 +(2 0.233 0.023 1.081 0.770 4.252 0.196 0.675 -0.339 0.220 -0.164
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 0.06 0.25 0.28 4.33** 15.54*** 0.79 1.71 6.07** 3.62*** 3.34*
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 0.89 3.46* 0.48 0.00 96.43*** 0.72 0.32 0.55 0.03 0.0056
PANEL C: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, SIC 3000 - 3999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rubber Leather Stone Primary Fabricated Industrial  Electrical Transportation Instruments Misc Mfg
Metals Metals Machinery Equipment Equipment
"0  INTERCEPT 0.009 0.034 0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.009 -0.033 0.011* 0.030** -0.001
(0.007) (0.030) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.014) (0.031) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
"1  Negative Taxable Income -0.013 -0.132** -0.055* 0.012 -0.013 -0.071*** -0.024 -0.032* -0.069** -0.009
       (NEGTI) (0.012) (0.042) (0.030) (0.013) (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026)
$1  LINE28DA>0 0.667*** -0.669* 0.801*** 1.084*** 0.928*** 0.926*** 1.484** 0.885*** 0.634*** 0.915***
(0.100) (0.331) (0.046) (0.071) (0.050) (0.104) (0.618) (0.048) (0.142) (0.109)
$2  LINE28DA<0 0.946*** 0.051 1.078*** 0.857*** 1.045*** 0.077 0.801* 1.099*** 0.933*** 0.708***
(0.118) (0.430) (0.116) (0.145) (0.090) (0.158) (0.461) (0.096) (0.144) (0.146)
(1  LINE28DA>0*NEGTI 0.360** 0.000 0.775 -1.091** 4.431* 0.068 -1.155* -0.596*** -0.238 -0.245
(0.179) (0.000) (1.058) (0.432) (2.593) (0.114) (0.676) (0.218) (0.224) (0.349)
(2  LINE28DA<0*NEGTI -0.099 0.000 -0.983** 0.084 -0.176 0.421* -0.638 -0.241* -0.749*** 0.118
(0.147) (0.000) (0.362) (0.308) (0.231) (0.237) (0.487) (0.129) (0.164) (0.211)
Observations 63 13 37 139 74 254 443 103 296 58
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.10 0.85 0.68 0.89 0.69 0.19 0.87 0.11 0.75
$1 + (1 1.027 -0.669 1.576 -0.007 5.359 0.994 0.329 0.289 0.396 0.670
$2 +(2  0.847 0.051 0.095 0.941 0.869 0.498 0.163 0.858 0.184 0.826
F-tests of coefficients: 
$1 = $2 2.54 1.48 4.42** 1.41 1.08 17.39*** 0.58 3.18* 1.49 0.96
$1 + (1= $2 +(2 0.96 1.48 1.23 2.76* 2.62 5.94** 0.25 4.16** 1.15 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
See Table 10 for a description of the variables.